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ABSTRACT 
 
There has been a commonly held belief, especially in the United States, that 
Chinese business is distinctively Chinese. Understanding its Chineseness in 
unitary, monolithic and national terms, this assumption has both underpinned a 
zero-sum perspective on U.S.-China relations, and fuelled the China threat 
argument. This paper seeks to critically examine this essentialist construction of 
Chinese business and its foreign policy implications. Drawing on a global 
production network (GPN) approach, the paper argues that as well as exhibiting its 
Chinese characteristics, Chinese business is increasingly characterised by its 
transnationalness, which calls into question the coherence and unity of the 
Chinese economy. In this context, the American construction of China as a 
singular, threatening economic entity not only fails to capture the multiple, unstable 
identities of Chinese business and the complexities of U.S.-China relations 
associated with them, but often serves to inform simplistic, counter-productive and 
even dangerous China policy in the age of global interdependence. 
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Introduction  
Understandings of contemporary China are frequently associated with 
observations of the Chinese economy in general and Chinese business in 
particular. If it is true that the business of the country is business (CBS News, 4 April 
2004), the shape and health of Chinese business may indeed tell us much about 
what China is and where it is heading. For example, when products made in China 
flood supermarkets worldwide, people see China’s growing influence. When some 
Chinese firms are engaged in dubious dealings with ‘problem states’, it calls into 
question the country’s ‘peaceful rise’ and its credibility as a responsible power. 
Thus, without doubt, Chinese business and China are closely interrelated. Insofar 
as ‘representations of the economy are part and parcel of specific definitions of a 
nation’ (Crane 1999: 215), those understandings of China are useful. And yet, what 
is problematic with those understandings is that explicitly or implicitly, they assume 
that Chinese business is distinctively and exclusively Chinese, in the sense that 
there exists a unitary, coherent actor called China, within and from which Chinese 
business operates and acquires national purpose and identity. In this way, the 
Chineseness of Chinese business is essentialised and taken for granted, as if it is 
as straightforward as is the meaning of the ‘Made in China’ label.   
 
In this paper, I want to shift from taking the Chineseness of Chinese business as a 
pre-existing, unequivocal point of departure for understanding China and its 
international relations, to treating the assumed ‘Chineseness’ itself as a question 
and an unstable site of contested meanings and constructions. The key question 
for this paper is thus: ‘What is Chinese about Chinese business?’ I will not, nor is it 
desirable or possible to, spell out what Chineseness actually means here. Rather, 
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I seek to shed light on the very fluidity and complexities of what is meant by 
‘Chinese’ in Chinese business, by problematising the conventional attempt to fix 
and essentialise it. Instead of understanding Chinese business in purely Chinese 
terms, I argue that we should see it as a duality of transnationalness as well as 
contingent Chineseness.  
 
To understand this transnationalness, here I will employ a global production 
network (GPN) approach instead of the more conventional state-centric approach. 
As I will illustrate, more than simply being the commercial and economic ‘arm’ of 
China, Chinese business is a good example of transnational or global 
interconnectedness at work. In this context, the explicit or implicit equation of 
Chinese business with ‘China’ as a coherent actor becomes at best an unwitting 
attempt to frame such transnational interconnectedness in the more manageable 
terrains of nation-states and inter-national relations. At worst, it is a particular way 
of constructing ‘China’ through conjuring up a threatening, monolithic ‘Chinese 
Other’ in economic terms so that particular forms of self-interest can be served or 
promoted. Thus, the construction of Chineseness in relation to Chinese business 
is not purely an academic exercise. What is at stake here is more than about 
getting to the bottom of the accuracy, or lack thereof, of China’s growth figures, 
production data and trade statistics, or the country’s relative strength or weakness 
vis-à-vis other nations. Rather, the social construction is intimately linked to the 
particular way in which the perceiver chooses to define power relations with 
‘China’ and formulate policy towards it. Given that this essentialist construction is 
particularly evident in a growing body of literature in the United States that 
identifies China as an economic superpower and strategic competitor,1 American 
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representations and their implications for U.S.-China relations will be the focus of 
my critique here. 
 
The paper begins with a brief survey of the essentialist assumption of China as a 
unitary, monolithic whole in mainstream U.S. representations of Chinese business. 
Secondly, drawing on the global production network perspective, the paper 
examines the extent to which Chinese business can (and cannot) be characterised 
as ‘Chinese’. Finally, it provides a critical analysis of the policy implications of this 
conventional construction of Chineseness for U.S.-China relations, so as to help 
open up some space for more effective and responsible ways of dealing with the 
challenge associated with China’s rise.  
 
Chinese Business in American Eyes: China as a Monolithic Economic Threat 
American conceptions of China have long been influenced by business and trade. 
Chinese imports such as tea and porcelain left one of the first American 
impressions about the Middle Kingdom (Cohen 1978: 54-86). For much of the 
nineteenth century, the market potential of its alleged 400 million consumers 
fascinated many Americans and their British brethren alike. Today, not 
surprisingly, Chinese business weighs even more heavily on the way in which 
Americans come to make sense of China, whose economy has for the past few 
decades been growing by nearly 10 percent annually, and has recently surpassed 
Japan and the UK as the world’s third largest trading nation and the fourth largest 
economy respectively.  
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First of all, the ‘Made in China’ phenomenon has deeply troubled many China 
observers in the United States. By various accounts, China is now the world’s 
number one producer of LCD screens and TVs. It produces two-thirds of all DVD 
players and other electronic equipment, three-quarters of toys, more than half of 
the world’s bikes, cameras, shoes, and telephones, and more than a third of air 
conditioners, computer monitors, luggage, and microwave ovens (Hornig and 
Wagner 2006; Navarro 2007). In an article entitled ‘When Everything Is Made in 
China’, Jeffrey E. Garten, Dean of the Yale School of Management, argued that as 
China is becoming a manufacturing superpower, the world could soon be 
‘dangerously vulnerable to a major supply disruption caused by war, terrorism, 
social unrest or a natural disaster’ (2002).  
 
Associated with the ‘Made in China’ phenomenon is ‘the China price’, which, as 
some have described, are ‘the three scariest words in U.S. industry’: 
 
In general, it means 30% to 50% less than what you can possibly make 
something for in the U.S. In the worst cases, it means below your cost of 
materials. Makers of apparel, footwear, electric appliances, and plastics 
products, which have been shutting U.S. factories for decades, know well the 
futility of trying to match the China price (Engardio, Roberts, et al., 2004). 
. 
 
As if the ‘China price’ is not threatening enough, the author of The Coming 
American Wars with China, University of California business professor Peter 
Navarro, recently coined the term ‘weapons of mass production’. Appearing before 
the Congress-mandated U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 
in February 2007, he testified that China’s growing influence as an economic 
superpower is owed to a set of ‘unfair, mercantilist trading practices’, which serve 
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as ‘weapons of mass production’ to allow China to ‘conquer one new export 
market after another (Navarro 2007).  
 
In addition to all this is still another ‘worrying’ trend, namely, China’s ‘going global’ 
strategy. In 2005, China’s oil company CNOOC launched a bid to buy the 
California-based oil company Unocal. American economist and commentator Paul 
Krugman compared it with the Japanese challenge in the 1990s, but his 
conclusions are markedly different: ‘Fifteen years ago, when Japanese companies 
were busily buying up chunks of corporate America, I was one of those urging 
Americans not to panic…. But the Chinese challenge—highlighted by the bids for 
Maytag and Unocal—looks a lot more serious than the Japanese challenge ever 
did’ (2005:15). Republican congressman Dana Rohrabacher went further, labelling 
the Unocal bid as ‘part of [China’s] long-term strategy for domination.’ He said that 
‘The greatest threat to our freedom, the greatest threat to America’s prosperity, is 
not radical Islam [but] a China that is emerging on the scene that is belligerent to 
everything we stand for as a people’ (Marshall 2005). Their views were shared by 
the American public: an opinion poll at the time found that 73 percent of Americans 
opposed the CNOOC-Unocal deal, with half of the respondents also perceiving the 
Chinese as an adversary (Hornig and Wagner 2006).  
 
In this context, many American scholars, strategic analysts and practitioners 
believe that the China challenge goes far beyond the economic realm, and may 
signal the beginning of a new power transition between a hegemonic power and its 
rising challenger in international history. Insofar as such transition often 
corresponds with war and conflict, many in the U.S. are convinced that the rise of 
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China represents a serious threat to U.S. national interest as well as international 
stability.2  
 
What is remarkable about these American understandings of Chinese business is 
not so much their conclusion of China as a threat. Rather, it is their equation of 
Chinese business with a singular, unitary, and more or less homogeneous actor 
called China. Invoking the words ‘China’ and ‘Chinese’ at ease, analysts told a 
story of a whole nation engaged in concerted efforts of building national greatness 
through sustained economic development and aggressive business strategies. A 
‘bill’ metaphor used by some commentator helps illustrate this point. For the U.S., 
this bill results from cheap imports from China. On this bill, the argument goes, the 
costs for the United States, apart from the big trade deficits with ‘China’, also 
include ‘domestic layoffs, the relocation of entire industries, cutbacks for research 
and development and the downfall of the once-almighty dollar’. And the ‘payee’? 
‘A population of billions’ (Hornig and Wagner 2006).  
 
While some take more than one billion people as a single economic actor, others 
believe the actor is even bigger, namely, ‘Greater China’ or ‘Cultural China,’ which 
encompasses Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, the Chinese diaspora around the 
world, as well as mainland China.3 ‘Put these different parts of the Chinese puzzle 
together, and you find unequal potential: a human resource pool that is not only 
the largest in the world but also includes a large number of scientists, engineers, 
and seasoned executives; an advanced and rapidly progressing technological 
infrastructure, and a leading industry position in many emerging technologies’ 
(Shenkar 2005:6). The perceived Chineseness of Chinese business, this time 
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defined in broad ethnic and cultural terms, similarly takes on an essentialist, 
unitary quality. 
 
Furthermore, such Chineseness is believed to have been further cemented by a 
political centre in Beijing. Many people are convinced that ‘Chinese’ products’ 
conquest of the global market is not the free market at work, but has the ultimate 
blessing of the Chinese government, for the ‘desk drawers of party strategists are 
filled with detailed plans promoting national industries from automaking to 
biotechnology’ (Hornig and Wagner 2006). Given that the Chinese government is 
the majority of many firms, the challenge of Chinese business becomes even more 
ominous, raising questions not only about unfair trading practices but the 
interrelationship between Chinese business interests and foreign policy objectives 
(Harding et al. 2006:58). With the government in control, the argument goes, 
China’s mercantilist trade policies ‘have not just helped China gain increasing 
economic, financial, and political power over U.S. institutions [… but] also been a 
primary catalyst for the rapid growth and modernization of Chinese military forces’ 
(Navarro 2007). 
 
In short, according to these American images, the Chineseness of Chinese 
business is not just geographically self-evident, but also culturally and/or ethnically 
homogeneous, and even politically unified. Linking all Chinese businesses 
together is this perceived common national identity, an identity which appears so 
unitary and self-contained that it is often equated with reified, visualised images 
ranging from ‘dragon’, ‘juggernaut’, and ‘locomotive’ through ‘China Inc.’ to ‘a giant 
sucking vacuum cleaner’ and a cash-rich ‘predator’ (The Economist 2006:77-78; 
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Leonard 2004:22; Wu 2005:27)4. With this assumption about a unified China 
behind booming Chinese business, not surprisingly, an alarmist version of the 
power transition theory has gained popularity. And along with the perception of 
China as a dissatisfied, revisionist power, a dichotomised, zero-sum 
understanding of U.S.-China relations becomes not only possible, but imperative. 
As Navarro insists, ‘It’s one thing for America to lose much of its blue collar 
manufacturing base to China. If the U.S. loses its white collar science and 
technology base too, it will be Americans living the peasant life rather than the 
Chinese’ (2007). 
 
While these images present a simple and easily understood picture of Sino-
American relations, I argue that their state-centric approach to Sino-U.S. relations 
no longer fully reflects the complexities and nuances of the contemporary global 
economy and transnational economic relations. Indeed, this dichotomised, nation-
based image of Chinese business, by pitting ‘a rising China’ against the ‘United 
States’ as two closed categories, threatens to poison this complex, crucial 
relationship. I will come back to the policy implications of these representations 
later in the paper. For now, it is necessary to draw attention to an important, 
alternative image of Chinese business, an image which questions the essentialist 
understanding of its Chineseness and brings to the fore its inherent 
transnationality.  
 
Global Production Networks and the Translationalness of Chinese Business 
In the age of mercantilism, the world economy ‘was constrained within political 
boundaries laid down by states through national monopolies and trade restrictions’ 
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(Cox 1987:107). Thus, at the time nation-based economies were more or less the 
norm. But the globalisation of economic activities has gradually rendered the 
national category less relevant and less meaningful. In The Work of Nations, 
Robert Reich, former Secretary of Labor in the Clinton administration, cast doubt 
on the continued existence of an American economy: ‘As almost every factor of 
production—money, technology, factories, and equipment—moves effortlessly 
across borders, the very idea of an American economy is becoming meaningless’ 
(Reich 1992:8). Similarly, in economic development studies, many scholars argue 
that ‘exclusive attention’ to the national state as the conventional unit of analysis 
‘is becoming less useful in light of the changes occurring in the organization of 
economic activities which increasingly tend to slice through, while still being 
unevenly contained within, state boundaries’ (Henderson, Dicken, Hess, Coe and 
Yeung 2002:437). 
 
While it would be absurd to deny that Chinese business has much to do with 
China, I argue that it is characterised also by transnationalness. By 
transnationalness, I mean in particular the dominance of ‘non-Chinese’ business 
within the Chinese economy, and fragmentation of Chinese business as a result of 
such dominance. Both Chineseness and transnationalness constitute what I refer 
to as the ‘duality’ of Chinese business. In this context, an exclusive attention to the 
former no longer does full justice to the complexities of ‘Chinese’ business today. 
The reliance on the nation-state as the primary unit of analysis, for instance, has 
resulted in an exaggeration of Chinese power in the global political economy 
(Breslin 2005:735), and a mistaken view of China as a model for national 
economic development. In the view of Hart-Landsberg and Burkett, China’s 
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economic experience cannot be understood ‘in national or even inter-national 
terms, as if China’s gains create opportunities for policy makers in other countries 
to promote their own national restructuring in ways that benefit their respective 
working-class majorities’ (2006:4). In other words, economic development in 
China, far from being a solely national phenomenon, exhibits increasingly 
transnational or global characteristics. This transnationalness is manifested in 
various sectors of Chinese business, but here my analysis will be focused mostly 
on manufacturing, not least because this sector, the main driving force behind 
China’s economic development, has attracted most attention in Western media.  
 
The transnational characteristic of Chinese manufacturing, rendered largely 
invisible by the state-centric approach, can be best examined from the global 
production network (GPN) perspective. The GPN refers to the contemporary 
development of capitalism which increasingly involves ‘the detailed disaggregation 
of stages of production and consumption across national boundaries, under the 
organizational structure of densely networked firms or enterprises’ (Gereffi, 
Morzeniewicz, and Korzeniewicz 1994:1-14). Characteristic of such globalised 
production networks are the existence of multiple (sub-state, transnational, as well 
as national) actors, their interconnections and complex power relations. In this 
way, the social origins and production of various production materials, labour, 
capital, information, technology, design, management, marketing, and 
consumption are no longer necessarily tied to a fixed, single locality or nationality, 
thus making the identification of business in national terms increasingly difficult 
and problematic, if not impossible. Placing strong emphasis on production and its 
processes, the GPN approach allows a fuller understanding of the ‘intricate links—
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horizontal, diagonal, as well as vertical’ that form ‘multi-dimensional, multi-layered 
lattices of economic activity’ (Henderson, Dicken et al. 2002:442).  
 
In doing so, the GPN approach adopted here does not imply a neoliberal rosy 
picture of globalisation as a win-win scenario or a politically neutral phenomenon. 
Quite the contrary, it allows great sensitivity to the uneven distribution of value and 
power in global production processes. As far as the organisation of economic 
activities is concerned, national boundary, ethnicity, domestic political governance 
have not disappeared or become totally irrelevant. Nevertheless, to the extent that 
power and production (particularly in its conventional sense of manufacturing) 
often do not coincide and converge on the same geographical space, the multiple, 
unstable identities of business and economy cannot be neatly fit into separate 
national categories. Indeed, while the nation-state is still widely seen as the most 
important actor in managing economy, in this process the state itself could, and 
have, become increasingly internationalised and intertwined with sub-state and 
transnational actors in the complex and ever-evolving global economic networks.  
 
Transnationalising Chinese Business 
Contemporary China and ‘Chinese’ business need to be located precisely in such 
global production networks. The rise of the Chinese economy, in the view of Dirlik, 
coincides with ‘an intensified interest in what has been called “Global Capitalism” 
or “flexible production”… [and the] temporal coincidence, to say the least, is 
intriguing, and raises questions concerning the conjuncture between a Chinese or 
Asian capitalism and what appears to be a new phase within capitalism globally’ 
(Dirlik 1997:304). This conjuncture, more specifically, is enabled by the 
Asia Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers 2007-20 12
convergence between the global capitalist search for better profit at the lowest 
possible costs and China’s decision to make most of its comparative advantage in 
cheap labour to develop its economy. In this sense, contemporary ‘Chinese 
business’ has been an integral part of global business, and its dynamic ‘identity’ is 
inevitably coloured by, and needs to be understood in relation to, ‘the nature and 
logic of the new transnational accumulation dynamics that are reshaping economic 
activity in China’ (Hart-Landsberg and Burkett 2004:4). 
 
China’s close relationship with the global production networks is most evident in 
two aspects: its connection with foreign direct investment (FDI), and its role as a 
major destination for outsourcing and subcontracting by transnational corporations 
(TNCs). Between 1985 and 2005, annual net FDI inflows into China grew from 
US$1 billion to US$72 billion. In the same period, China took in more than $600 
billion in FDI, twelve times the total stock of FDI Japan received between 1945 and 
2000. In the early 1990s, FDI inflows have further accelerated in light of Beijing’s 
decision to allow a new form of FDI, wholly owned foreign enterprises (WOFEs). 
By the early 2000s WOFEs accounted for 65 percent of new FDI in China. Since 
1993, China has consistently been the largest recipient of FDI among developing 
countries.5  
 
Underlying these massive inflows of FDI is a growing trend for TNCs to outsource 
and subcontract production and even services to China. To date, corporations 
from 190 countries and regions, which include 450 of the Fortune global top 500 
multinational corporations, have invested in China (Xinhua News Agency, 21 May 
2006), further contributing to its integration into the global production networks. In 
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this process, according to Shenkar, Chinese manufacturers initially serve as 
‘component suppliers to foreign buyers and as Original Equipment Manufacturers 
(OEMs).’ Such firms produce to the specifications of foreign firms who then 
distribute and sell the product in their home or other foreign markets or embed it in 
one of their end products. The second phase sees entire operations being 
subcontracted to China, with the foreign firm maintaining ‘oversight, branding, and 
marketing’ (Shenkar 2005:78, 17). By one account, 60,000 foreign-owned factories 
had been opened between 2003 and 2005. Along with such a global shift in 
production, China has been turned into East Asia’s main producer of final products 
and final export platform. As a testimony to this remarkable metamorphosis, over 
the 1992-2000 period, parts and components accounted for 42 per cent of its 
import growth but only 17.9 per cent of China’s total export growth (Hart-
Landsberg and Burkett 2004:14). Or take China’s computer-related products for 
example: nearly three quarters of those products are made by Taiwanese 
companies on the mainland, and those companies in turn rely on OEM contracts 
with Japanese and US companies. Consequently, a transnational production chain 
emerges, which includes the world’s most developed countries such as the U.S. 
and Japan, semi-periphery economies such as Taiwan, and developing states like 
China (Breslin 2005:745).  
 
Just as both the region’s production networks and China’s role within it have been 
transformed by FDI inflows and outsourcing and subcontracting processes, so too 
has the meaning and identity of Chinese business. If anything, this particular 
‘location’ of ‘Chinese’ business in the global production networks has profoundly 
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complicated its Chineseness, and added to it a transnational dimension which is 
defined predominantly by what may be described as ‘non-Chinese’ business.  
 
By ‘non-Chinese’ business, I do not suggest a dichotomy between Chinese and 
non-Chinese businesses, but rather use it for analytical convenience. And by the 
dominance of ‘non-Chinese business’ in the Chinese economy, I mean foreign 
control over major processes and components of production in China, such as 
exports, technology, and profit. In the area of exports, for example, Chinese 
subsidiaries of global multinationals and joint ventures with businesses from the 
industrialised countries accounted for ‘fully 65 per cent of the total increase in 
Chinese exports’ between 1994 and mid-2003 (Hart-Landsberg and Burkett 
2006:7). While China’s exports of industrial machinery grew twenty-fold in real 
terms between 1993 and 2003, foreign funded enterprises’ (FFEs) share of them 
grew from 35 percent to 79 percent. Over the same period, exports of computer 
equipment increased from $716 million to $41 billion, with the FFEs’ share rising 
from 74 percent to 92 percent. As Gilboy points out, ‘This pattern repeats itself in 
almost every advanced industrial sector in China’ (2004:38, 40). Arriving at a 
similar conclusion, Yasheng Huang wrote that ‘Foreign firms have established 
majority controls over FIEs in most industries. Only in seven out of twenty-eight 
manufacturing industries are foreign firms found to have an average aggregate 
minority equity position’ (2003:19). As a footnote to this increasing foreign 
dominance in Chinese manufacturing industry, in 2001, 11 Chinese enterprises 
were among the world’s top 500 businesses, but not a single one was from the 
manufacturing sector. 
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The ‘non-Chinese’ dominance in China’s production and export activities is echoed 
and underpinned by a similar pattern with regard to technology, services, branding 
and marketing. Foreign companies manage virtually all intellectual property in 
China and account for 85% of its technology exports (Lunding 2006:8). Gavin 
Heron, managing director of TBWA/Shanghai, said that China is ‘a story of 
international brands, not local ones…. As soon as a local brand has any traction, 
they’re bought out by a multinational’ (Donaton 2005:21). Indeed, foreign 
companies’ technology and branding superiority has allowed them to establish 
dominant positions in China’s production (such as delivery dates, industry and 
quality standards, design specifications) even without ownership (Breslin 
2005:745). For example, brand-name producers such as Levi-Strauss, The GAP, 
Reebok and Nike enjoy strong control over a wide range of labour-intensive 
consumer goods, such as clothing and footwear, which are produced by buyer-
driven commodity chains (Sum and Pun 2005:184). Similarly, through control of 
industry standards—a phenomenon dubbed ‘Wintelism’—Microsoft and Intel have 
huge influence over access to the PC market without producing PCs themselves 
(Breslin 2005:745).  
 
In this context, the lack of a domestic technology base has made Chinese 
companies in many industries at the mercy of their multinational counterparts, in 
terms of both technology access and licensing fees. The transnational alliance that 
controlled the core DVD technology, for example, initially demanded significant 
licensing fees from Chinese DVD manufacturers, and only reached agreement on 
a reasonable fee after several rounds of prolonged negotiations (Sull 2005). And 
to take another example, more than a decade as a junior joint venture partner to 
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the global giant Volkswagen, Shanghai Auto had no capability to compete as an 
independent car maker. Volkswagen even expressed doubt publicly whether, after 
China’s admission into the WTO, it would need its Shanghai ‘partner’. The only 
‘strategy’ left for Shanghai Auto was to start a second ‘joint venture’ with GM 
(Nolan 2002:126-7).  
 
Moreover, dominance in the areas of capital, production, export, and technology 
naturally translates to dominance over value and profit. While Chinese companies 
may be doing well from export earnings, U.S., Japanese and European 
transnationals continue to maintain the added value and technological lead (Kerr 
2007:92). It is estimated that between 60% and 80% of the value of all Chinese 
exports are processed (imported) components (Ravenhill 2006:670). Because the 
import content of the FFEs is often much higher, exports from FFEs in China yield 
much less value-added for the national economy than the roughly equal value of 
exports from ‘national’ firms (Wade 2005:312). Thanks to Wintelism, leading 
foreign enterprises, through controlling the sales channel and market standards, 
still control the realisation of value. Intel, for example, earns as much as 10 
percent of its total $30 billion a year in revenue from selling computer 
microprocessor chips to China (Sun, Qiu, and Jie). For this reason, Japan’s alarm 
over the fall of its personal computer exports to the United States as opposed to 
China’s rise in its PC exports may be misplaced. Those trade figures fail to reflect 
the fact that the computers assembled in China rely on high value-added 
technology from Japan and elsewhere (Wade 2005:313).  
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This phenomenon is as applicable to labour-intensive products as it is to the high-
tech sectors. A Barbie doll made in China is sold for $20 in Western markets, but 
only about 35 cents is retained by China. ‘What China got in the past few years is 
only some pretty figures,’ said Mei Xinyu of the Commerce Ministry’s research 
institute. ‘American and foreign companies have gotten the real profit’ (Barboza 
2006:1). Not surprisingly, acutely aware that this uneven distribution of profit in the 
global production networks is in their favour, executives from Microsoft, Starbucks, 
Costco, Weyerhaeuser and Amazon.com extended a warm welcome to the visiting 
Chinese president Hu Jintao in April 2006, ‘all eager to show the Chinese leader 
their appreciation for his efforts in providing American businesses with an ample 
supply of cheap labor, a stable currency exchange and an affable investment 
climate’ (Kwong 2006:1). These transnational businesses understand too well that 
Chinese business means not just Chinese business, but their own business as 
well. 
 
It now becomes clearer that products ‘made in China’ are not necessarily made by 
China, nor does the bulk of the profits necessarily go China’s way (Breslin 
2005:743). What does this mean, then, for the identity of Chinese business and for 
the implications of Chinese business success? To put it simply, as part of the 
global production networks, China is mainly ‘acting as the manufacturing conduit 
through which the regional deficit is processed, with China running deficits with 
“supplier” states in East Asia, and surpluses with ‘demand’ states in Europe and 
North America’ (Breslin 2005:743). For this reason, bilateral trade figures between 
nations become often misleading. Frequently, the burgeoning sales of ‘non-
Chinese’ manufacturing operations in China to the U.S., for example, are counted 
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as ‘Chinese exports’, leaving an impression of China’s rapid rise into an economic 
superpower status (Shenkar 2005:10). However, looked through the GPN prism, 
this image of Chinese economic prowess is largely unwarranted. While China 
recorded a $200 billion trade surplus with the United States in 2005, it also 
accumulated a $137 billion trade deficit with the rest of Asia (Barboza 2006:36). In 
2003, for instance, China took in 40-50 percent of Asia’s exports, accounting for all 
of Taiwan’s and the Philippine’s export growth and over half of each of Japan’s, 
Malaysia’s, South Korea’s and Australia’s (Hart-Landsberg and Burkett 2004:13). 
Similarly, while China recorded a $25 billion surplus with Japan in 2000, this 
surplus would disappear if we take into account Japan’s $26 billion surplus with 
Hong Kong, the main port of entry for Japanese goods into southern China. Also, it 
is worth adding that more than half of Sino-Japanese trade is now conducted 
among Japanese companies (Brooke 2001:3).  
 
Insofar as the control over production and technology is located elsewhere, even 
the role of Chinese business as ‘the final stop in a global production line’ (Browne 
2005:A2) may not be stable in the longer term. Some argue that in competing on 
price, discounters such as Wal-Mart, Target, Best Buy, and Circuit City commonly 
seek low cost, reliability, short lead time, and vast production capacity—‘a 
combination that inevitably leads to China’ (Shenkar 2005:146). For Chinese 
business, this trend may be anything but inevitable. Breslin suggests that ‘it is 
largely corporate decisions driven by understandings of market behaviour in core 
economies’ that have done much to boost Chinese exports and fuel the ‘Made in 
China’ phenomenon (Breslin 2005:748).6 As such, China, with its cheap labour 
costs, vast domestic market and good infrastructure, remains an attractive place 
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for foreign investment for now. However, as the global production networks 
expand and the global division of labour intensifies, the package of technology and 
skills required at any one site is becoming narrower and more specific. In this 
context, ‘when only a small part of the production chain is involved, out-contractors 
and TNCs have a wider choice of potential sites’ (Hart-Landsberg and Burkett 
2006:19). What this means is that China’s position as the ‘world’s workshop’ 
should be seen as historically specific, not something intrinsic to Chinese 
business. With wages rising in China, low-cost production is no longer its exclusive 
advantage. As The Economist recently reported, ‘In the calculus of costs, risks, 
customers and logistics that goes into building global operations, an increasing 
number of firms are coming to the conclusion that China is not necessarily the best 
place to making things’ (The Economist 2007). Hence, ‘Made in China’, so far the 
hallmark of Chinese business success, may face increasing challenge in the years 
ahead, as the recent decisions of transnational companies Intel, Flextronics, and 
Yue Yuen to divert their investment to China’s neighbours can illustrate (The 
Economist 2007).  
 
Fragmenting Chinese Business  
At this point, it is worth emphasising that by ‘non-Chinese business’ I do not imply 
the existence of unitary, monolithic Western business or American business. 
Rather, my point is that thanks to the expansion of the global production networks, 
Chinese business is not purely Chinese, and that the boundaries between 
‘Chinese’ and ‘non-Chinese’ businesses have become increasingly blurred. An 
important implication of these blurred boundaries is that even within ‘Chinese 
business’, the assumed unity and coherence is questionable. 
Asia Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers 2007-20 20
Of course, for some, the interconnection between Chinese and non-Chinese 
businesses merely disguises the very existence of a more or less uniform entity of 
Chinese business on a larger scale, namely ‘Greater China.’ It is argued that what 
is alleged to be the dominance of non-Chinese business in China, upon a closer 
examination, may reveal the dominance of overseas Chinese businesses. For 
instance, rather than a major indication of non-Chinese dominance in Chinese 
business, a large proportion of ‘foreign’ direct investment actually comes from 
‘Greater China’ or the Chinese diaspora: Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and 
overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. Given the common cultural 
and ethnic ties, they still seem to constitute a coherent Chinese business network, 
variably known as the ‘bamboo network’ and an ‘invisible empire’ (Weidenbaum 
and Hughes 1996; and Seagrave 1996).  
 
The existence of a loose Chinese business network across ‘Greater China’ cannot 
be denied. However, this Chinese network does not exist in isolation from the 
larger global economic networks. Hong Kong, for example, may be a major source 
of ‘foreign’ direct investment in China, but this does not mean that the origins of 
the investment are necessarily based in Hong Kong or even come from China 
itself (known as ‘round-tripping’). Breslin notes that through their subsidiary offices 
in Hong Kong, some foreign businesses have been able to disguise their 
involvement in the Chinese economy. For example, it is estimated that about 80 
percent of Japanese FDI in Hong Kong is subsequently reinvested in Guangdong. 
On the surface, this appears to be Hong Kong investment into China, but it is in 
fact Japanese investment (Breslin 2005:746). By analysing the flow of final trade in 
the East Asian region, Hart-Landsberg and Burkett similarly note that the business 
Asia Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers 2007-20 21
network of Greater China, ‘rather than reflecting a growing regional independence 
and balance,’ is formed primarily ‘in response to the changing needs of 
transnational corporate production networks’ (2004:17). Thus, even in its ‘Greater 
China’ guises, Chinese business is not a uniform, self-contained cultural entity, but 
is underpinned and defined by extensive production networks between greater 
China and the rest of the world. In other words, ‘the “imagined” Chinese 
transnational ethnicity’  and the implied new economic relationships among greater 
China need to be put in the context of ‘the production processes of a Global 
Capitalism centered in trans-national corporations’ (Dirlik 1997:309-311).   
 
Even if it is possible to isolate ‘Chinese business’ in ‘Greater China’ from the 
global economic networks, the so-called ‘common’ ethnic and cultural bonds mask 
the internal diversity and differences among the vast Chinese communities, where 
the meaning of being Chinese itself is constantly changing and frequently 
contested (Tu 1994). The Chinese diaspora, spanning across a diversity of regions 
and national spaces, consists of different and localised communities and identities, 
whose loyalties by no means converge on a single centre, let alone a political 
centre in Beijing. It is no secret that Taiwan, led by pro-independence politicians, 
has long been engaged in a deliberate effort of cultivating a new Taiwanese 
identity in distinction from mainland China. In Singapore, where what ‘Chinese’ 
actually means is often subject to fierce debate, ethnic Chinese see themselves 
‘as Singaporean first and huaren (ethnic Chinese) second, if ever. It would be a 
horror to them if one now still calls them overseas Chinese or huaqiao, the 
sojourners’ (Tan 2003:751-774; Chan 2000:288).  
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With such localised identities naturally come parochial and sometimes conflicting 
values and interests among ‘Chinese businesses’, which may bear close 
resemblance to ‘a global patchwork of many small enterprises that, in some cases, 
have little or no respect or love for one another’ (Kao 1993:33). In business 
dealings, the Taiwanese often distrust their Hong Kong or mainland counterparts, 
whereas Singaporeans are acutely conscious of deep value differences between 
themselves and the mainland Chinese (Chan 2000:12). Once embraced by 
mainland China, the notion of ‘Greater China’ as a singular, unified business 
network has lost much of its appeal within the PRC (Callahan 2005:273). As one 
mainland Chinese scholar put it, ‘we reject the concept of Greater China…. 
Overseas Chinese come not because they are patriotic but because of investment 
benefits’ (Dirlik 1997:321). 
 
‘Internal’ diversity and fragmentation are not only characteristic of Chinese 
business in ‘Greater China’, but also within China proper. Two factors stand out 
here: China’s decentralisation-oriented reform and the expansion of the global 
production networks into Chinese business. As Peter Nolan notes, with ‘a strong 
tradition of relatively autonomous local government’, China’s economic reform 
based on decentralisation has only reinforced this autonomy tradition in business 
(2002:131-132). Meanwhile, most clearly symbolised by its WTO entry, China’s 
integration into the global production networks has further undermined the 
coherence of the Chinese economy. In a zealous drive to join tracks with 
international standards (yu guoji jiegui), many Chinese companies have not only 
acquired a dependence on transnational capital and technology, but more 
remarkably, have also shied away from ‘collaboration within their industry, 
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especially if such collaboration crosses regional or bureaucratic boundaries’ in 
China (Gilboy 2004:42). In fact, as Gilboy points out, ‘China’s best firms are 
among the least connected to domestic suppliers: for every $100 that state-owned 
electronics and telecom firms spend on technology imports, they spend only $1.20 
on similar domestic goods’ (Gilboy 2004:42). Not surprisingly, the Chinese 
economy ‘has been variously described as a “cellular” economy, federalism, 
Chinese-style, or de facto federalism’ (Huang 2003:140). Thus, even if Chinese 
businesses are all located within the same national space and run by Chinese, 
they are still a long way from, if ever, becoming a unitary, coherent Chinese 
economic actor.  
 
This is not to say that Chinese political and business leaders do not want to 
construct a coherent national economy based more on innovation tan cheap 
labour. On the contrary, the Chinese government has attempted at assembling a 
national team in global economic competition, and is seen as the main driving 
force behind Chinese companies’ ‘go global’ strategy. This leads some scholars to 
suggest that ‘China is “nationalising” globalization: pursuing a policy of selective 
and strategic integration that bends globalization to China’s long-term nation-
building goals’ (Kerr 2007:78). Despite such nationalist desire and effort, however, 
the Chinese government seems to have played at best an ambivalent role in 
relation to Chinese business. While the dream of rebuilding China’s national 
greatness through economic development remains alive and well, the 
unmistakable path the state has chosen to realise that goal has precisely been to 
globalise its economy and business. In explaining China’s policy on foreign 
investment, Zhang Yansheng, director of the Institute for International Economic 
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Research under the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) put it 
bluntly: 
 
In an effort to introduce outside competitors to further promote the 
transformation of the market economy, we prefer strategic alliances with 
foreign investors…. Despite more wholly foreign-owned companies aiming at 
preventing technology spillover, we will give more preferential treatment to 
the multinationals with R&D centers in China (Beijing Review 2007).  
 
This strategy is not inconsistent with China’s official discourse on national 
economic development, first advanced by Deng Xiaoping, and then adhered to by 
his successors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. As Crane puts it, in this discourse, 
‘There is still a strong impulse to defend the imagined [national] economy, but this 
must be accomplished in concert with global capital’ (1999:230). If anything, this 
seems to denote what Robert Cox calls the ‘internationalization of the state,’ a 
process of ‘interstate consensus formation regarding the needs or requirements of 
the world economy that takes place within a common ideological framework.’ A 
characteristic of this internationalisation of the state, according to Cox, is that 
states have acquired ‘a responsibility to both’ national economies and the world 
economy (1987:254-255).7 As a result of this dual responsibility, it is not surprising 
that the Chinese state’s role in its national economic development often appears 
ambiguous and even contradictory. In the words of Crane, economic nationalism 
in Deng’s and Jiang’s China ‘has taken on some rather odd forms: the aggressive 
courting of direct foreign investment; the listing of companies on foreign stock 
exchanges; and the concerted effort to enter multilateral trade organisations. 
These are hardly the actions of a staunchly neomercantilist power’ (1999:230).8
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Such ambiguity may help explain that some of China’s business giants emerged 
not because of state support, but despite state neglect and bias against them. For 
example, the much taunted Haier success story had its humble beginning as a 
loss-making enterprise, which had to turn to villagers to borrow money as it was 
unable to secure credit from state banks (Liu and Li 2002:700). Kelon, a Chinese 
home-appliance company, tells a similar story of its bittersweet relationship with 
the state. The company was initially refused a production license by both the 
Ministry of Light Industry and Guangdong province, where it was founded. It 
caught the attention of top leaders only ‘after the firm claimed top position in the 
industry in 1991.’9 And current privately owned vanguards, including Huawei 
Technologies and TCL, were not designated as national champions in the first 
instance (Lunding 2006:7).  
 
Also, the latest ‘going global’ strategy of many Chinese companies, often 
perceived as orchestrated by the state, reveals that they are not so much 
supported by an ambitious state as they are ‘pushed’ out by intense competition in 
domestic markets from foreign funded enterprises. According to a 2003 survey of 
China’s fifty largest ‘industry-leading’ firms by the Shanghai office of the Germany-
based Roland Berger Strategy Consultants, slightly more than 50 percent of the 
participating firms named ‘seeking new markets’ as the overriding imperative for 
globalising their business activities. Among this group of firms, manufacturers in 
particular cited growing competitive pressure from multinational companies in the 
home market, excess capacity, and sliding profit margins as key reasons to search 
for new markets abroad (Wu 2005:28; Liu and Li 2002:700). Consequently, 
Chinese companies’ going global, instead of representing a coherent national 
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strategy, may in fact testify to a decline in Chineseness in China’s current 
domestic business environment.  
 
Thus far, what this section has demonstrated is that at least as far as China’s 
status as the world factory is concerned, the rise of China does not mean a net 
flow of power from the U.S. to China as a unitary state actor. Given the penetration 
and expansion of global production networks in China, the commonly assumed 
Chineseness associated with Chinese business does not quite exist in the sense 
that it is understood as a homogeneous, singular, and pure entity. What is 
palpable instead is its duality of Chineseness and transnationalness, the two sides 
of the same coin of China’s global economic integration.  
 
Of course, one can argue that this transnationalness may be a temporary 
characteristic of China’s relentless pursuit of its national greatness. As China 
continues to develop and innovate, it may eventually be able to stand on its own 
feet and re-assert its economic primacy. What is not so Chinese about Chinese 
business today may mask a gradual, long-term revival of its Chineseness. By that 
time, it is argued that the world in general and the United States in particular may 
have much more to fear, but it may be too late to do anything about it. Certainly, in 
this paper, I do not deny the continued ability for China to innovate and develop. 
After all, this is a nation with a long and proud history of technological innovation. 
However, what I am doubtful is the assumption that at some point in this process, 
China could somehow slam shut its door to the global economic system and 
remove its transnational connections. It seems to me that a more powerful China 
is likely to be a more, not less, transnationalist China.  
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Constructing ‘Chinese Business’ as Otherness:  
Implications for U.S. Responses to the ‘Rise of China’ 
Of course, the future is always difficult to predict and a more transnationalist China 
is by no means an preordained outcome. This is especially so if the U.S. adheres 
to a nationalist understanding of China’s development. Against this background, it 
is now necessary to come back to the American perceptions of Chinese business 
as inherently Chinese. Far from being an objective account of what Chinese 
business is, they are better seen as a particular construction of China as 
Otherness (Yao 2002:8). By focusing on the so-called Chineseness of Chinese 
business, those imageries have helped to conjure up both a singular, 
homogeneous, and threatening economic powerhouse that is China and a volatile 
power transition scenario in U.S.-China relations.  
 
When identity is conceived as construction, Dirlik usefully reminded us of the need 
to look at ‘who is doing the constructing and to what end’ (1997:303, 319). As a 
particular way of constructing Otherness, the American construction of the 
Chinese identity performs two important political functions. Firstly, it serves as an 
explanatory framework. Reflecting ‘a larger unease with globalization’ (Harding et 
al 2006:61), the imagination of Chinese business as a unified economic threat 
provides a simple, ready-made conceptual framework within which the fast-paced 
dislocations and uncertainties associated with economic globalisation could be 
understood. Whenever many of the economic woes at home cry out for attention, 
be they job losses or trade deficits, the image of China as an economic threat 
stands out as a convenient answer. To the extent that Chinese business is 
interpreted as a singular actor, the so-called Chinese business practices, such as 
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the ‘China price’ and ‘weapons of mass production’, can become meaningful as 
well. Those business practices, often termed ‘unfair’, ‘dubious’ or ‘suspicious’, then 
could supply a coherent set of explanations for the ‘rise of China’ as well as for 
‘our’ relative decline. 
 
Secondly and more importantly, this construction of Otherness is prescriptive in 
practical and policy terms. While explaining where faults and problems lie, the 
perceptions of Chinese business as a closed national category are often able, 
even if they are not intended, to mobilise public support and influence policy-
making on China. Only when Chinese businesses and their practices are cast in 
national terms, can their alleged ‘victims’ suitably take on similar national 
significance in terms of, for example, American national interest, national security, 
national competitiveness, or national identity. And when the national interest, 
security and national identity are thought to be at stake, any measures that are 
allegedly able to safeguard these interests would be more easily legitimatised and 
implemented. For example, without doubt, it is American perceptions of a Chinese 
takeover that helped to mobilise politicians and the public to foil Haier’s attempt to 
buy Maytag and CNOOC’s high-profile bids to buy Unocal in 2005. With U.S. 
national security believed to be at stake, the fact that ‘Unocal’s oil and gas 
reserves were mostly located in Asia to begin with, and played a negligible role in 
satisfying US energy demand, made little difference to those who voted against 
CNOOC’ (Klare 2006:183).  
More importantly, by visualising Chinese business as something of a coherent 
whole, unified around a single centre, this construction not only obscures the 
changing dynamics of Chinese business in the complex global economic 
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networks, but also informs a zero-sum approach to China and justifies otherwise 
unjustifiable actions against this perceived national security threat. For example, 
Souchou Yao notes that the prevalent images of ‘Chinese economic success’ in 
Southeast Asia, with the unquestioned Chineseness at their core, were in many 
ways complicit in the murderous race riots in Malaysia during May 1969 and the 
violent anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia in the wake of Suharto’s downfall (Yao 
2002:4). In times of economic and political volatility, the equation of specific 
Chinese businesses with such totalising categories as race and class conveniently 
but often violently shifted the target of public outrage away from the relevant 
regime and onto ethnic Chinese populations as a whole. Though with less 
disastrous consequences, similar episodes were replayed in Spain in September 
2004, when local footwear manufacturers, chanting ‘Chinese out,’ burned two 
Chinese-owned warehouses in revenge for their business losses from ‘unfair 
Chinese competition.’  
 
Yet it is in the United States that the policy implications of such construction could 
be the most catastrophic. In recent years, the ‘rising China’ image in general and 
the common perceptions of Chinese business in particular have already sparked a 
series of China-focused policies in Washington. For instance, in 2000, Congress 
mandated the establishment of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission to monitor the national security implications of U.S.-China economic 
relations, the only such institution in the U.S. that is directed at a specific foreign 
country. In July 2005, blaming an ‘artificially undervalued Chinese currency’ for the 
ballooning U.S. trade deficits with China, senators Charles Schumer and Lindsey 
Graham sponsored a bill to impose an across-the-board punitive tariff of 27.5 
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percent on Chinese imports. Some Congress members interpreted this measure 
as ‘part of a sea change in congressional thinking that will eventually force the 
administration to give up its engagement strategy and begin to challenge China’ 
(Marshall 2005). And in early 2006, echoing a US Senate legislation that urged the 
government to revoke its permanent normal trade relations with China, 
Washington announced the setting up of a task force to ensure Beijing’s 
compliance with global trade rules. Again, this task force, focusing on just one 
country, was unprecedented in U.S. history (Crutsinger 2006; Cronin 2006). 
Indeed, Washington has become so unease about China’s economic challenge 
that on some days, as many as four congressional committees simultaneously 
have China on their agenda (Hornig and Wagner 2006).  
 
While such anti-China rhetoric and policies are lent credibility and urgency by the 
frightening image of a rising Chinese behemoth, I argue that these nationalistic 
economic policies are frequently unjustified, misguided, and even dangerous. To 
begin with, those policies do not necessarily serve America’s national interests as 
alleged. More often than not, as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce admitted, 
industry-specific or region-specific interests have been ‘miscast as homeland 
security or national security imperatives’ (Hawkins 2006:7). For example, the 
interests that the Schumer-Graham bill would best serve are more likely those of 
the textile industry in South Carolina, Graham’s home state. Similarly, it cannot 
just be pure coincidence that the author of a House resolution demanding a 
national security review of CNOOC’s bids of Unocal, House Resources Committee 
Chairman Richard Pombo, is from the district where the headquarters of Chevron, 
CNOOC’s rival bidder, are located (Weisman 2005:D1). Should these ‘China’ 
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problems be framed in terms of specific business issues, which I think they are, 
they would have lost much of their galvanising impact on the government or the 
general public.  
 
Moreover, many of the policies are often misguided in that the assumed 
Chineseness of Chinese business denotes a zero-sum economic relationship 
between China and the United States, a relationship which bears little 
resemblance to the interconnectedness between ‘Chinese’ and ‘non-Chinese’ 
(including American) businesses. One of the clearest examples of this Sino-
American zero-sum game has been the alleged loss of U.S. jobs to China. 
However, by the U.S. Bureau of Labor’s own estimates, in any given year, the 
direct numbers of American jobs lost to China are fewer than 10,000 (Pethokoukis 
2007). A Time article notes that the jobs associated with most of the goods Wal-
Mart sells in the U.S., disappearing from the U.S. long ago, went mainly to Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and South Korea, which means ‘Wal-Mart’s China trade may indeed 
be eliminating factory jobs—but in South Korea, not South Carolina’ (Elliot and 
Powell 2005). Thus, China is not yet the kind of economic threat it is made out to 
be. In fact, it has been America’s fastest growing export market in recent years. 
Although total U.S. exports stalled between 1993 and 2003, its exports to China 
tripled in the same period (Gilboy 2004:36). Given the importance of the Chinese 
market, the World Bank estimates that if China’s growth rate fell by just 2 percent, 
up to 60 percent of China’s bank loans would become nonperforming, thereby 
threatening both China’s and Asia’s financial systems, which in turn could 
adversely affect the U.S. economy (Pethokoukis 2007). China’s importance in the 
world economy is not primarily because of its rise as an independent economic 
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superpower, but due to its deep enmeshment into the global economic networks. 
A focus on its “Chineseness” would have easily overlooked this non-zero-sum 
dimension, an dimension which is intrinsic to U.S.-China relations. 
 
From the global production network perspective, not only does the assumption of a 
zero-sum game between China and the United States become problematic, but 
the notion of the so-called ‘Chinese business practices’ becomes problematic, as 
what is often termed as ‘Chinese business practices’ may be seen as a product of 
the interactions between Chinese and transnational companies, including U.S. 
companies. For instance, the Unocal bids by CNOOC, a state-owned company in 
China, has been seen as a proof of China’s sinister business strategy to 
undermine U.S. national security. Yet, what is less well-known is that Goldman 
Sachs, whose CEO Henry Paulson is currently U.S. Treasury Secretary, was 
involved in financing the aborted CNOOC-Unocal deal (Hawkins 2006). In this 
sense, Chinese companies’ acquisitions of natural resources in various parts of 
the world, while drawing much alarm and criticism in the U.S. and elsewhere, are 
nothing uniquely Chinese. As Michael Klare explains,  
 
the United States, Britain, France, Japan, and other Western oil-importing 
countries have long competed among themselves for drilling rights in 
overseas producing areas…. China may be a newcomer to this contest, but 
is not behaving noticeably differently from the other oil-seekers. Indeed, the 
“National Energy Policy” announced by President George W. Bush on May 
17, 2001, calls for US officials to conduct the same sort of diplomatic quest in 
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pursuit of foreign energy as that now being undertaken by Chinese officials 
(Klare 2006:182). 
 
Understood this way, threatening to retaliate against ‘China’ is not only unlikely to 
eliminate those ‘Chinese’ business practices, but it could in fact provide further 
impetus to them. It is in this sense that I consider the policies based on a unitary 
Chinese economic Other counterproductive and potentially dangerous. Again take 
the American nationalistic responses to CNOOC’s Unocal for example. By 
effectively declaring to the Chinese that North America is off limits, American 
policy-makers sent ‘precisely the wrong message to China’s modernizing 
managerial class and encourage highly damaging … tendencies in China, 
including nationalism, mercantilism and distrust of the international markets’ 
Harding et al 2006:64). Similarly, Hadar notes that ‘by taking steps to derail the 
Unocal-CNOOC deal, Washington is helping set in motion what could be only 
described as a self-fulfilling prophecy’ (2005). Since no amount of U.S. legislation 
would be able to reduce the global production demand for energy in China, China 
would seem to ‘have no choice in light of the US policies but to form special 
economic or foreign policy relationships’ with the so-called ‘rogue states’ (Hadar 
2005). Of course, this in turn could confirm the suspicion of China many 
Americans have long held, thereby giving rise to a vicious cycle of mutual 
suspicion and hostility. Starting out with the image of a homogeneous Chinese 
Other and consistently acting upon it, hawkish policy-makers in Washington could 
well succeed in bringing out a more unified rival in China down the road.   
 
Conclusion 
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In this paper, I have examined and questioned the widely held assumption of 
Chineseness about Chinese business, particularly in the context of American 
representations of it as a singular, self-contained actor. Locating Chinese business 
in the evolving, non-linear global production networks, I have argued that instead 
of representing something uniquely and homogeneously Chinese, the identity of 
Chinese business is best seen as a duality of Chineseness and transnationalness.   
 
In this context, the American representations of Chinese business are not 
objective, neutral analysis, but a particular way of constructing Otherness. Not only 
does this construction of Other provide a simple conceptual framework within 
which the complexities and uncertainties of globalisation’s impact on the U.S. can 
be (mis)understood, but it also serves to inform and shape specific U.S. responses 
to China. More often than not, these policies, based on a zero-sum understanding 
of U.S.-China relations, are unjustified, misguided, and dangerous, as they could 
well become a self-fulfilling prophecy by provoking and reinforcing nationalist 
responses from China.  
The implications of such a construction of Chinese business are not just confined 
to U.S.-China relations, but also applicable to China’s other bilateral relations, 
such as with Japan. Already, many have been alarmed by the fact that China and 
Japan have emerged both powerful for the first time in history. Yet, if we 
understand the issue through the transnational production network approach, then 
the fact need not in itself be a cause for concern. This is because, also for the first 
time, the region has been linked through complex production networks which 
render the category of national economies less salient or relevant.  
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Still, international competition has not disappeared and inter-national relations will 
no doubt survive into the future. As Sino-American relations and Sino-Japanese 
relations can illustrate, national interests and national security remain the key 
concerns of policy-makers and the public alike. As Michael Yahuda points out, 
‘Notwithstanding the close and significant economic interdependence between 
China and Japan, there is no corresponding spillover into social, intellectual, or 
security engagement’ (2006:181). While the persistence of international 
geopolitical struggle is partly because of historical legacies, more importantly, it is 
also related to the remaking of that history through our continued state-centric 
construction of international relations. In this sense, international tensions have 
less to do with the ‘limits of economic interdependence’ per se than with the 
limitations of our thinking to come to terms with the changing global reality in less 
state-centric terms. By utilising the GPN approach, this paper therefore hopes to 
contribute to the problematisation of the state-centric imagination of global politics 
in general and Chinese business in particular, so that U.S.-China relations, for 
instance, could be understood and practised in ways other than merely inter-
national politics and its allegedly recurring tragedy of great power rivalry. 
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